Abstract. In FSE 2014, an authenticated encryption mode COBRA [4], based on pseudorandom permutation (PRP) blockcipher, and POET [3], based on Almost XOR-Universal (AXU) hash and strong pseudorandom permutation (SPRP), were proposed. Few weeks later, COBRA mode and a simple variant of the original proposal of POET (due to a forging attack [13] on the original proposal) with AES as an underlying blockcipher, were submitted to CAESAR, a competition [1] of authenticated encryption (AE). In this paper, we show a forging attack on the mode COBRA based on any n-bit blockcipher. Our attack on COBRA requires about O(n) queries with success probability of about 1/2. This disproves the claim proved in the FSE 2014 paper. We also show both privacy and forging attack on the parallel version of POET, denoted POET-m. In case of the modes POET and POE (the underlying modes for encryption), we demonstrate a distinguishing attack making only one encryption query when we instantiate the underlying AXU hash function with some other AXU hash function, namely a uniform random involution. Thus, our result violates the designer's main claim (Theorem 8.1 in [1]). However, the attacks can not be extended to the specifications of POET submitted to the CAESAR competition.
Introduction
The common application of cryptography is to implement a secure channel between two or more users and then to exchange information over that channel. These users can initially set up their one-time shared key. Otherwise, a typical implementation first calls a key-exchange protocol for establishing a shared key or a session key (used only for the current session). Once the users have a shared key, either through the initial key set-up or key-exchange, they use this key to authenticate and encrypt the transmitted information using efficient symmetric-key algorithms such as a message authentication code Mac(·), pseudorandom function Prf(·) and (possibly tweakable symmetric-key) encryption Enc(·) respectively. The encryption Enc provides privacy or confidentiality of the plaintext M . The message authentication code Mac and pseudorandom function 1. Tagged encryption AE.enc k : On an input message M from a message space M ⊆ {0, 1} * and an associated data A from an associated data space D ⊆ {0, 1}
* , it returns a tagged ciphertext 1 Z ∈ {0, 1} * .
2. Verified decryption AE.dec k : On an input tagged ciphertext Z and an associated data A, it returns a plaintext M when Z = AE.enc k (M, A), called valid tagged ciphertext. Otherwise, for all invalid tagged ciphertext Z, it returns a special symbol ⊥.
Note that both algorithms take the shared key k from a keys-space K = {0, 1}
L key where L key denotes the key-size. The key includes keys for an underlying blockcipher, masking keys etc. Some constructions derive more keys by invoking the blockcipher with different constant inputs.
Privacy and Authenticity Advantage. Informally speaking, an AE scheme is said to have privacy if the tagged ciphertext behave like a uniform random string for any adaptively chosen plaintext. More formally, let A be an oracle adversary which can make queries to AE.enc adaptively. Let $ be a random oracle which returns a uniform random string for every new query. We define the privacy advantage of A against AE to be where the probability is taken under K and the random coins of A. By fresh, we mean that Z is not a response of an encryption query of A. 
Our Contribution
In this paper, we investigate the resistance of the two authenticated encryption schemes COBRA and POET against forging and privacy attacks. The paper is essentially divided in two sections: Section 4 describes the forging attack for COBRA and Section 5 describes forging and privacy analysis on the POETmode and its parallel variant, called POET-m.
1. Attack on COBRA. In this paper, we show a forging attack on the submitted version of AES-COBRA. In fact, the attack works for the mode COBRA based on any blockcipher. Thus it disproves the claim stated in [4] . The authenticity advantage of our proposed algorithm is about 1/2 and it makes about 2n encryption queries where n is the plaintext size of the underlying blockcipher.
2. Analysis of POET and POET-m. The designers of POET have recommended a parallel version, denoted POET-m. We provide distinguishing and forging attacks on it. Moreover, the designers claimed security of POET for an arbitrary AXU or almost XOR universal hash function (the formal definition of AXU hash function is given in Section 2). Here we disprove their claim by showing a distinguishing attack on a special choice of AXU, namely a uniform random involution. Thus, the security proof of the claims have flaws.
We also extend this to a forging attack. All these attack algorithms make very few encryption queries and succeed with probability close to one.
We would like to note that while the COBRA is affected by our attack, the instantiation of the POET candidate which uses specific AXU hash functions is not affected.
Basics of Almost XOR Universal (AXU) Hash

Notation and Basics
In this paper, we fix a positive integer n which denotes the block size of the underlying blockcipher. We mostly use AES (advanced encryption standard) [11] with 128 bit key size as the underlying blockcipher and in this case n = 128.
Binary Field. We identify the set {0, 1}
n as the binary field of size 2 n . An n bit string α = α 0 α 1 ...α n−1 , α i ∈ {0, 1} can be equivalently viewed as a polynomial α(x) = α 0 + α 1 x + · · · + α n−1 x n−1 . For notational simplicity, we write the concatenation of two binary strings α and β as αβ. The field addition between two n bit strings is bit-wise addition ⊕ (we also use "+"). Let us fix a primitive polynomial p(x) of degree n. Field multiplication between two n-bit strings α and β can be defined as the binary string corresponding to the polynomial α(x)β(x) mod p(x). We denote the multiplication of α and β as α · β. Thus, the zero polynomial 0 and the constant 1 polynomial are the additive and multiplicative identity respectively. Moreover, x is a primitive element since the polynomial p(x) is primitive.
Almost XOR Universal (AXU) Hash
Universal hash functions and its close variants strongly universal, AXU-hash [9, 12, 20, 22, 23, 21, 18] are information theoretic notions which are used as building blocks of several cryptographic constructions, e.g., message authentication code [9, 24] , domain extension of pseudorandom function [5, 8] , extractor [17] , quasi-randomness and other combinatorial objects [12, 21] .
Polynomial Hash. Polynomial hash [20] is one of the popular universal hash which can be computed efficiently by Horner's rule [14] (same as computation of CBC message authenticated code [2, 6] ).
Definition 2. [20]
We define the polynomial-hash indexed by L ∈ {0, 1} n over the domain ({0, 1} n )
It is easy to see that the function mapping (a 1 , . . . ,
is a non-zero polynomial and hence it has at most d distinct roots of L.
Four-Round AES. The AES (for 128 bit keys) has ten rounds. However, it has been shown that four-round AES has good differential properties. More formally, Daemen et al. in [10] showed that four-round AES is a family of 2 −113 -AXU under the simplified assumption that all four round keys are uniform and independent.
Uniform Random Involution. The uniform random function from {0, 1} n to itself is an 2 −n -AXU hash function. A function f : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} n is called an involution if f is inverse of itself (so it must be permutation). Let I n denote a random involution whose responses are defined according to the following procedure: After responding to every query, it updates two sets: the set of all queries D and the set of all responses R. On a query x ∈ D ∪ R, it returns an element chosen uniformly from the set {0, 1} n \(D ∪R). If x ∈ D then it returns the previous response corresponding to x. Similarly, if x ∈ R then it returns the previous query y ∈ D for which the response was x.
Lemma 1. The uniform random involution I n (as defined above) is an
n and δ ∈ {0, 1} n . Let us assume that x ⊕ x = δ. By conditioning I n (x) = y, we must have I n (x ) = y ⊕ δ which happens with probability at most 1/(2 n − 2). Note that if y = x or y = x ⊕ δ then the probability is zero. So
by similar argument as before we also have differential probability bounded above by 1 2 n −2 . This proves the Lemma.
Combination of AXU hash functions
Compositions of AXU hash functions Now we show that property of being an AXU-hash function does not preserve under composition with same key. In other words, there exists an -AXU
Trivially, a similar result holds if we apply the CBC mode for a uniform random involution I n . The CBC mode applied to a function f is defined as follows:
and y 0 = 0 n . So when d = 2 and x 2 = 0, CBC In (x 1 , 0) = I n (I n (x 1 )) = x 1 and so CBC
In is not δ-AXU for any δ < 1. However, it is true for some specific choices of F L , e.g. when F L is field multiplier. In this case, CBC F L is nothing but the poly-hash which has been shown to be d/2 n -AXU (see the paragraph immediately after Definition 2).
Sum of AXU hash functions Now we consider another method of domain extension of AXU hash function. Given an -AXU F L , we define the sum hash
Note that if F L is linear (which is true for the field multiplier) then the sum hash can be simplified as
for which a collision can be found easily. So it can not be δ-AXU for any δ < 1. However, this does not work when we consider a uniform random function or involution and we concatenate a counter to message blocks.
Description of COBRA
COBRA is an authenticated encryption mode based on blockcipher. It was originally published in FSE 2014 [4] . Later the same mode with AES as the underlying blockcipher, called AES-COBRA, was submitted to CAESAR [1] . The mode can be viewed as hash then ECB (or electronic code-book) type encryption where hash function is poly-hash and ECB is applied on a double block, i.e., 2n bit plaintext. The double block encryption is defined by two-round Feistel structure [15] .
2 As it uses Feistel structure, it is inverse-free. In other words, even though it is based on AES blockcipher, the decryption of COBRA does not require AES decryption. 
Encryption Mode for COBRA
COBRA is defined for any messages of size at least n bits. Now we briefly describe how the encryption algorithm of COBRA works for all inputs M ∈ ({0, 1} 2n ) + . In addition to a message M , it also takes a nonce N ∈ {0, 1} n and an associated data A, and outputs a tagged ciphertext (C, T ) where |C| = |M | and T ∈ {0, 1} n . Readers are referred to [4, 1] for complete description of the algorithm (i.e., how it behaves for other input sizes). We write
2n . We also write
n are also called blocks and M i 's are called double blocks. Let β i ' and γ i 's be independent uniform random (or pseudorandom) permutations over {0, 1}
n for all i ≥ 1. We describe the COBRA-mode based on these permutations. 3 It uses the two-round Feistel structure which is defined as follows:
It is easy to see that it is invertible and the inverse function 2LR
Algorithm 1: COBRA encryption algorithm for a nonce N ∈ {0, 1} n , and a messages M of sizes multiple of 2n. Note that the associated data has no influence on the ciphertext. It is used for computing the tag.
Tag Generation and Verified Decryption Algorithm
The final tag T is computed from nonce N and U (depends only on the associated data A) and
We simply denote the tag by T (N, U, S). One can find the details of the construction of T in [4, 1] . The verified decryption algorithm takes a tagged ciphertext (C 1 , . . . , C d , T ) where C i 's are double blocks and T ∈ {0, 1} n . It works as follows:
1. It first computes
Forging Attack on COBRA
We first state the following fact which plays key role in our forging attack.
Fact 1.[7]
Let h ∈ {0, 1} n be a fixed element and h n . Then, the probability that there exists b 1 , . . . , b s ∈ {0, 1} such that i h i bi = h is at least 1 − 2 n−s . Furthermore, the sequence b 1 , . . . , b s can be efficiently computed.
Key Idea of the Forging Attack. Now we describe the main idea of our forging attack. Our attack fixes nonce and associated data and so we simply denote the tag T (N, U, S) by T (S). Suppose M 0 is an encryption query with T 0 := T (S 0 ) as a tag where S 0 denotes the S-value for the message M 0 . Suppose C 
n holds with high probability for suitably chosen queries.
Forging Algorithm F 0 . Now let us fix a positive integer whose exact value will be determined later. We define the following messages
Let M 0 be the all zero block message. Our forging algorithm makes + 1 many queries, namely M i 's.
Forging Algorithm F 0 for COBRA. 
It makes encryption queries M i and obtains responses (C
Now we compute the success probability of the forging attack. The forging algorithm aborts in two cases. We show that the abort probabilities are small. Moreover, given that it does not abort, we also show that the forging attack works perfectly. Theorem 1. The forgery algorithm F 0 has success probability at least Claim. Let us assume that we have found such b 1 , . . . , b −1 ∈ {0, 1} which happens with probability at least 1 − 2 n− . Then,
We first note that (C * , T ) is a fresh tagged ciphertext as the last double block of ciphertext is different from those of all other tagged ciphertexts. To prove that tagged ciphertext is valid, we first compute S * and S 0 for the given forged ciphertext and M 0 respectively where S 0 denotes the S values for the message M 0 .
Computation of S 0 . Computation of S 0 is straightforward from its definition.
Computation of S * . Now we compute S * under the assumption that the first abort does not hold, i.e., we have found
Note that the xor of ciphertext blocks which is equal to ⊕ −1 j=1 h j bj ⊕ h 1 = h. Now we decrypt the forged ciphertext double blocks by applying 2LR −1 . Let
) be the i th double block of forged ciphertext after we apply Luby-Rackoff two round decryption. Similarly, we denote P i values for M j query as P j i . As all ciphertext double blocks C * i have appeared in responses of queries at the same position, the P * i values, 1 ≤ i ≤ are given as below.
By linearity of poly L , we can simply write for 1 ≤ i ≤ − 1,
Now if the second abort does not hold then (i.e., ⊕ j b j = 1) we have S * = h⊕Σ = S 0 . This proves the claim.
Probabilities of the Abort Events. Now we informally argue that the second abort probability is
's are independent and uniform. So the probability is 1/2. By Fact 1, the first abort does not hold with probability 1 − 2 n− and now we claim the second abort does not hold with probability 1/2. Hence success probability of forging is at least 1 2 (1 − 2 n− ) which is almost 1/2 if we set = 2n.
Remark 1. Note that in the above attack, we can verify whether the forged ciphertext tag pair is valid without querying it. So we can repeat this process n times (we choose bit 0 or 1 in different position instead of the last bit as described above) to succeed with probability of about 1 − 2 −n .
Remark 2.
In the above analysis we make several probabilistic assumptions to make the analysis clean and simple. Here we list these.
1. We assume that h i j 's are independent and uniform. However, for a fixed i, h i 1 and h i 0 are not completely independent as these are generated from ideal online random permutation. However, for these 4n outputs
these are statistically very close to the uniform distribution with distance about 4n 2 /2 n . 2. True distributions of b i 's may not be uniform and independent. It actually depends on how we define b i 's as there could be more than one choice of b i 's. However, all of these choices would lead to abort with probability of about 1/2 or less.
Security Analysis of POET and POET-m
In this section we analyze POET and its parallel variant POET-m for some positive integer m.
Return (C1, C2, ..., C , T )
Algorithm 2: POET-m encryption algorithm for a messages M of sizes n with < m. Let τ be an n-bit element which is derived from associated data. The elements L 1 , . . . , L m−1 are derived keys and S is a key derived from length of the message. 
POET-m and Its Security Analysis.
POET-m: We first describe ciphertext generation algorithm of parallel version POET-m. We consider F L to be the field multiplier hash in which message block is multiplied by the key L. We describe how POET-m works for all messages (M 1 , . . . , M ) with < m. Let τ be an n-bit element which is derived from associated data. The elements L 1 , . . . , L m−1 are keys derived by invoking pseudorandom permutation on different constants (see [1, 3] for details). Note that the input of the blockcipher X i is a sum hash. When we instantiate the AXU by field multiplier we can simplify the sum hash (due to linearity). We have
where L is the remaining part depending only on keys. We use this expression to mount the attack.
Privacy Attack on POET-m. We first demonstrate a distinguishing attack on POET-m distinguishing it from uniform random online cipher when m > 4. We make two queries
We denote the corresponding internal variables by X, C's and X , C 's. It is easy to see that X 2 = X 2 and X 3 = X 3 and hence C 3 = C 3 with probability one. This equality of third ciphertext block happens with probability 2 −n for uniform random online cipher. So we have a distinguisher which succeeds with probability almost one. The presence of fourth block makes sure that X i 's are defined as above (as the final block is processed differently). We can keep all other inputs, for example nonce, associated data etc., the same.
Forging Attack on POET-m. Now we see how we can exploit the above weakness in sum of AXU hash to mount a forging attack on the construction. We can forge when the number of message blocks is less than m and the last block is complete (as described in Algorithm 2). We first simply describe how the decryption algorithm works. Assume m > 3 and let C 1 , C 2 , C 3 , T be an input for decryption where C i , T ∈ {0, 1} n . We note the following observations:
2. Verification algorithm depends on X 3 , Y 3 , T and some fixed values depending on associated data and key.
We make one query M = (M 1 , M 2 , M 3 ) and obtain the response (C, T ) where
We denote the corresponding internal variable by X, C's and X , C 's. It is easy to see that by choices of C and the first observation Y 3 = Y 3 and so X 3 = X 3 . Again by the second observation, we see that verification algorithm depends on X 3 , Y 3 , T (or X 3 , Y 3 , T ) and some fixed information based on key and associated data. So, whenever verification algorithm passes for X 3 , Y 3 , it must pass for X 3 , Y 3 . Thus, (C 1 , C 2 , C 3 , T ) is a valid forge.
Note that the above attack is a single query forging attack and hence it is also applicable to situations where nonce can not be reused. POET: We now describe ciphertext generation algorithm of POET, i.e. POE the underlying encryption algorithm. In [1], the following theorem (restated) was claimed:
Security Analysis of POET mode
Theorem 8.1 of POET submission in [1] . Let E be a uniform random permutation, F t and F b be independent -AXU hash functions. Then, for any privacy adversary A making at mostueries of a total length of at most σ blocks, we have
Here we consider F t and F b to be any arbitrary AXU functions as mentioned above in Theorem 8.1 of the submission POET in [1]. Given messages (M 1 , . . . , M ), we compute for 1 ≤ i ≤ − 1 as follows:
where X 0 = Y 0 = τ . The last ciphertext block is computed differently and we do not need its description for our distinguishing attack. Note that X i is computed by CBC Ft . If F t is a uniform random involution then as we have seen before, after applying CBC mode to F it does not remain δ-AXU for all δ < 1. We use this property to obtain a distinguisher.
Privacy Attack on POET with uniform random involution F t . Now we demonstrate a privacy attack on POET distinguishing it from uniform random cipher when F L is instantiated with uniform random involution. In this attack we only make a single query and so it is also nonce-respecting. This would violate Theorem 8.1 of the submission POET in [1] (online permutation security of POE). We believe that the theorem remains valid when F L is instantiated with field multiplier (however, proof needs to be revised). The attack is described below.
Claim. Pr[C 2 = C 4 ] = 1 where (C 1 , C 2 , . . .) is the response of (M 1 , 0, 0, 0, · · · ) to POET with involution F t .
We prove the claim by using the involution property of F . We can easily see that 1. X 3 = F (F (X 1 )) = X 1 and 2. similarly, X 4 = X 2 = F (X 1 ).
So Y 1 = Y 3 and Y 2 = Y 4 and hence C 2 = C 4 . Note, we can choose any arbitrary nonce and associated data. This proves the claim.
In an ideal case, we observe C 2 = C 4 with probability 2 −n . So the distinguisher of POET has advantage at least 1 − 2 −n .
Conclusion
In this paper, we demonstrate forging attack on COBRA with practical complexity. Hence the theorem proved in [4] is wrong. We also demonstrate forging and distinguishing attack on POET-m for one particular recommended choice of AXU hash function. We also disprove the security claim for POET by presenting a distinguishing attack on a different choice of AXU hash function (not in the recommended list). However, these attacks on POET do not carry over to the versions submitted to CAESAR.
